Data on assignees of patenters are used to analyze the mobility of semiconductor inventors. A model of the entry and staffing of spinoffs of incumbent producers is developed to explain the higher mobility of semiconductor inventors in Silicon Valley. Exploiting data on the origins of semiconductor producers with larger sales, we argue that the greater mobility of semiconductor inventors in Silicon Valley was due primarily to spinoffs and not the clustering of the semiconductor industry there or California?s ban on the enforcement of employee non-compete covenants. To the extent that greater inventor mobility benefited Silicon Valley semiconductor producers, the benefits were mainly experienced by entrants and not incumbent producers.
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higher in Silicon Valley. Using data on changes in the assignees of patenters to infer labor mobility, we analyze the extent to which higher rates of mobility among semiconductor patenters in Silicon Valley are attributable to the initial staffing choices of spinoff entrants.
A distinguishing prediction of our model is that spinoff entry raises job mobility from incumbents to spinoffs during spinoffs' early years when they hire their initial staff. In contrast, if clustering is a direct cause of higher labor mobility, Silicon Valley patenters should have higher mobility even after taking into account the flow of patenters from incumbents to new entrants. Another possibility is that job mobility was higher in Silicon Valley because California bans the enforcement of employee non-compete covenants (Gilson [1999] ), which in the computer industry appears to have contributed to higher job mobility throughout California (Fallick, Fleischman, and Rebitzer [2006] ).
2 This too should elevate job mobility of all patenters and so should persist even after accounting for the flow of patenters from incumbents to new entrants.
Our findings indicate that Silicon Valley patenters had over three times higher mobility than patenters elsewhere. After taking into account firm factors, especially the size of patenting, and the flow of patenters from incumbents to new entrants, no significant difference is left between the mobility of patenters in Silicon Valley and elsewhere. These findings suggest that any greater knowledge diffusion brought about by higher rates of job mobility in Silicon Valley was due to knowledge flowing mainly from incumbents to entrants. If so, then incumbents would not benefit from being located in clusters, which would help explain the long-standing success of Texas Instruments and Motorola, both of which were located far from Silicon Valley.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we lay out our model. In Section III we describe how the data were compiled. In Section IV we present broad patterns in the data. In Section V we analyze statistically the determinants of inventor mobility and regional variations in mobility rates. In Section VI we discuss our findings and offer concluding remarks.
II. Model of Spinoff Entry and Hiring Choices
The semiconductor industry began around 1950, but did not begin to cluster in Silicon Valley until after the entry of Fairchild Semiconductor in 1957. Fairchild pioneered the integrated circuit in the early 1960s, but it was racked by a number of problems, including not recognizing the market potential of the IC, that led many of its top employees to leave and found their own firms. Its most prominent spinoffs were National, Intel, and AMD, which were founded in 1967, 1968, and 1969 respectively. In total, over 3 100 semiconductor firms entered in Silicon Valley between 1957 and 1986 , nearly all of which were spinoffs of other Silicon Valley semiconductor firms, and the industry increasingly clustered in Silicon
Valley (Klepper [2009] ). The model takes the initial clustering of the industry in Silicon Valley in the early 1960s as given and focuses on the subsequent entry of spinoffs in Silicon Valley and elsewhere and their effects on regional job mobility.
The model embodies a few key ideas. All spinoffs are assumed to have to hire an initial staff of workers to get started. Given their lack of experience, spinoffs are assumed to hire initially only experienced workers from firms in their industry. Following various theories of spinoffs (cf. Klepper and Thompson [2010] ), spinoffs are assumed to pursue ideas that arose at their parent but their parent chose not to pursue. They initially hire workers from their parent that worked on these ideas. 3 They also initially hire workers from other local incumbents to minimize relocation costs of employees.
In the model, it is less costly for new spinoffs in Silicon Valley to hire workers because of the greater local availability of labor. Consequently, spinoffs are more profitable in Silicon Valley, causing the rate of spinoffs to be higher in Silicon Valley than elsewhere. In turn, the greater availability of labor in Silicon Valley along with the higher rate of spinoffs there contributes to a higher turnover of workers in
Silicon Valley due to the flow of workers from incumbents to new spinoffs.
The model formalizes conditions under which these claims follow. It also yields additional implications that are used to test its logic.
Set-up
Suppose that at some time t after the start of the industry, semiconductor firms are located in j = 1, 2, …, J+1 regions, one of which is Silicon Valley where the industry is clustered. This is represented as follows. Initially, each of the J regions other than Silicon Valley has one firm. For symmetry, Silicon
Valley has J firms. All firms are assumed to have to hire N workers initially to be able to operate. For simplicity, suppose all incumbent firms have N workers, which abstracts from subsequent expansion.
At time t, there is a non-zero probability in each incumbent firm that an idea arises that it chooses not to pursue but some employees that worked on the idea consider pursuing in a spinoff. The profits of the potential spinoff equal L + !, where L is the net surplus from the N initial hires of the spinoff and ! is a 4 random draw from a distribution F(!) with unbounded support that reflects the ability of the spinoff's founder(s). A spinoff enters iff L + ! ! 0. If it enters it locates in the same region as its parent firm.
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L is determined as follows. We assume that K < N workers, including the spinoff's founders, previously worked at the spinoff's parent on the idea exploited by the spinoff. These workers are more productive at the spinoff than at its parent and the spinoff hires them at a wage greater than their marginal product (and wage) at their parent but less than their marginal product at the spinoff, yielding the spinoff a surplus of " per worker. Subsequently, these workers never move to another incumbent as their productivity and compensation is always greater at the spinoff. The other workers at the spinoff's parent and at other semiconductor firms are no more productive at the spinoff than at other firms. To hire them, a spinoff must pay them a risk premium µ above their marginal product and a relocation premium # if the spinoff is located in a different region from their employer. Consequently, a spinoff will first hire workers from local firms. It is assumed that only a fraction m of workers will be willing to change employers, and a spinoff will be indifferent between hiring additional workers from its parent or other local firms.
The net surplus of the spinoff from hiring the initial N workers is the difference between their marginal product and wage. Consequently,
where N r is the number of workers hired from firms outside the spinoff's region. A spinoff enters if L + ! ! 0, which requires the ability of the founders to be such that ! ! (N-K)µ + #N r -"K. If incumbents lose workers or expand, they hire workers from outside the industry, including new graduates. These workers are less expensive to hire and incumbents have experienced workers that can train them.
Denote the number of spinoffs at time t in Silicon Valley as S and in all other regions combined as R. For simplicity, it is assumed that S(N -K) is less than the number of movable workers in Silicon
Valley. This insures that all spinoffs in Silicon Valley hire all their workers locally. In contrast, other regions contain only one firm and spinoffs cannot staff all their initial needs from their parent firm (some of its N workers are not movable). Consequently, spinoffs in other regions must hire workers from outside their region.
Implications
Consider first the rate at which firms spawn spinoffs at time t. The probability that a (potential) spinoff enters is 1-F((N-K)µ + #N r -"K). Since only spinoffs in Silicon Valley hire all their workers locally, N r is greater and 1-F((N-K)µ + #N r -"K) is lower for potential spinoffs outside Silicon Valley.
Therefore, it follows that:
Proposition 1: Firms in Silicon Valley spawn spinoffs at a higher expected rate and E(S) > E(R). 4 A rationale for this assumption will be provided later.
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Consider next the expected turnover rate of workers in Silicon Valley and elsewhere. Define the expected turnover rate of workers in region j at time t as the expected number of workers that change jobs in region j at time t divided by the number of workers in region j at time t. The R spinoffs outside of Silicon Valley hire some of their workers from firms outside of their region, including workers in Silicon
Valley, whereas the S spinoffs in Silicon Valley hire all their workers from Silicon Valley firms.
Therefore, the expected turnover rate of workers at time t is less than E(R)N/JN for workers outside Silicon Valley and is greater than E(S)N/JN for workers in Silicon Valley. Given that E(S) > E(R), it follows that:
Proposition 2: At all times, the expected turnover rate is greater for workers in Silicon Valley than elsewhere.
Intuitively, the availability of workers is greater in Silicon Valley than in other regions and so
Silicon Valley firms do not need to leave their region to find workers. Combined with the greater number of spinoffs in Silicon Valley, this results in a higher turnover of workers there.
We can derive some additional implications of the model that aid in testing its logic regarding the higher mobility of workers in Silicon Valley. It follows by assumption that Silicon Valley spinoffs hire a greater percentage of their workers locally (100%) than spinoffs elsewhere. The opposite is true regarding the fraction of workers that spinoffs hire from their parents. To see this, consider first spinoffs not located in Silicon Valley. They hire the K workers from their parent that are more productive at the spinoff and then all other movable workers from their parent before turning to more costly workers outside their region. In contrast, after hiring the K workers from their parent, spinoffs in Silicon Valley are indifferent between hiring additional workers from their parent and from other local firms and are equally likely to hire any of these workers. Therefore, it follows that:
Proposition 3: Spinoffs in Silicon Valley hire a greater percentage of their initial workers from local firms but are expected to hire a smaller percentage of these workers from their parent.
The model also implies that the turnover rate of a firm's workers at time t depends on the number of spinoffs of the firm at time t, as each spinoff of a firm initially hires away at least K of its workers. is embedded in their workers and incumbents hire workers from their rivals to gain their knowledge. As such, the heightened job mobility resulting from clustering will hold for all workers and will persist for workers in Silicon Valley even after taking into account the effect of spinoffs and other firm influence on job mobility.
Another possibility is that clusters are promoted by laws such as in California banning the enforcement of employee non-compete covenants. Such laws would also be expected to increase job mobility, in which case clusters would be characterized by higher job mobility. Fallick et al. [2006] analyze this possibility in the computer industry using a model in which shocks lead employees to move from one incumbent firm to another. Based on this reasoning, to the extent that the mobility rates of semiconductor workers are higher in Silicon Valley due to California's ban on the enforcement of noncompetes, this should also still be the case after taking into account the influence of recent spinoffs and other firm influences on job mobility. Furthermore, semiconductor firms in Silicon Valley should be more able to hire workers from their parents than firms elsewhere (i.e., outside of California). This suggests that spinoffs in Silicon Valley would hire a greater fraction of their initial workers from their parents than spinoffs elsewhere, which is the opposite of Proposition 3 implied by the model.
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III. Data
Testing the predictions of the model requires data on worker mobility rates and also on the heritage of semiconductor producers. (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg [2001] ) were used to determine which of these patents were assigned to the ICE firms. The classes included 257 (Active Solid-State Devices), 326 (Electronic Digital Logic Circuitry), 327 (Miscellaneous Active Electrical Nonlinear Devices, Circuits, and Systems), 365
(Static Information Storage and Retrieval), and 438 (Semiconductor Device Manufacturing). These patents accounted for between 60% and 70% of the patents issued to the Silicon Valley semiconductor producers on our list, which were mainly semiconductor specialists. 7 In contrast, for larger diversified firms like RCA, TI, and Motorola that were located outside of Silicon Valley, these five classes encompassed roughly a third of their patents. Our data on spinoffs only pertain to the semiconductor spinoffs of the ICE firms. Consequently, we need to restrict the analysis to semiconductor inventors, as 8 we will not be able to explain the mobility of other inventors even if it was related to the formation of (non-semiconductor) spinoffs.
Eighty-one of the ICE firms in our dataset were assigned patents, reflecting the fact that even within our sample of major producers, the smaller firms were not assigned any patents. As such, our sample contains all the main patenters among the merchant producers in the period we consider, which begins in the mid 1960s when the earliest patents in our sample were applied for. The 81 firms are listed in the Appendix along with information about their heritage, patents, and job mobility.
We sorted all of the patents by inventor. For patents beginning in 1976, we used Lai, D'Armour, and Fleming [2009] to deal with subtle differences in the way some inventors' names were recorded on their patents. For earlier patents the classification was done by hand. We also adjusted the classifications when merited based on an individual review of the patents issued to each inventor. 8 Each inventor's patents were ordered by time of application. An observation involves two consecutive patent applications by the same inventor, denoted as A 1 and B 2 , where the subscript denotes the application date of the patent
(1 refers to the first patent, 2 to the second) and A and B denote the firm assignee of each patent. We restrict observations to cases where both firm A and B are on our list, the two patents are classified into one or more of our five semiconductor classes, and the inventor did not apply for another patent (in any class) assigned to a firm not on our list between dates 1 and 2. acquired firm A in the year before date 2 or earlier then the first patent is considered as belonging to firm B (so no job change occurred). We discovered a number of observations (A 1 , B 2 ) where the inventor actually moved not from firm A to firm B but from firm B to firm A before date 1. These cases occurred when firm B applied for a patent in the inventor's name after he had left firm B and applied for a patent at firm A. We inferred these cases from the full history of an inventor's patents and adjusted moves accordingly. 10 A small number of other cases were more complicated and were adjusted on an individual basis.
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8 For example, Lai et al. [2009] distinguished Michael Allen, who was granted five semiconductor patents between 1981 and 1987 that were assigned to AMD, and Michael J. Allen, who was granted 15 patents between 1988 and 1995 that were assigned to Intel. Because the Intel patents followed quickly those at AMD, both Intel and AMD are semiconductor producers, and their names were so close, we classified these two inventors as the same person. 9 We checked for patents assigned to firms not on our list by collecting all the patents of each inventor in our sample from Lai et al. [2009] and used the NBER database to determine the firm to which each patent was assigned. This covers only patents granted since 1976. Consequently, for observations where date 1 is before 1976 we cannot rule out a patent applied for by the inventor between dates 1 and 2 that is assigned to a firm not on our list. 10 For example, suppose that corresponding to an observation (A 1 , B 2 ) we found the inventor's successive patents were B, B, A 1 , B 2 , A, A-i.e., two were assigned to firm B and applied for before date 1 and two were assigned to firm A and applied for after date 2. In these cases, patent B 2 was likely applied for by firm B in the inventor's name after he had moved to firm A (and already applied for a patent at firm A). In such cases, we included the first two B
Dating moves was also challenging. It might be thought that for observations (A 1 , B 2 ) involving a move, the move occurred between dates 1 and 2. However, the above case indicates that the move could have taken place before date 1. Indeed, we randomly sampled 20 inventors with consecutive patents assigned to different firms and found that when we could reconstruct the inventors' work history, on average the inventor moved .25 years before date 1. 12 This suggests that date 1 is a pretty good estimate of when the inventor moved. Accordingly, we date the year of the move based on date 1 unless the inventor applied for a later non-semiconductor patent at firm A, in which case we use the year of that application as the year of the move, or if firm B entered later than date 1, in which case we use the year firm B entered as the year of the move. This year is referred to as the year of the observation.
We restricted our analysis to observations (A 1 ,B 2 ) where both patents were granted between 1970 and 2002 and patent A was applied for by 1987 or earlier (date 1 is based on the application date of patent A, which could be before 1970) in order to construct a sample with a sizable number of observations in the 1960s before the semiconductor industry was heavily clustered in Silicon Valley. We did not consider patents A 1 applied for after 1987 because our information on the origin of firms ended with entrants in 1987. We allowed patent B 2 to be granted as late as 2002 in order to allow for sufficient years to elapse to detect a change in employer. We have 7,879 observations in total involving 2,508 inventors, 279 of whom moved once, 27 who moved twice, and one who moved three times.
IV. Broad Patterns
Before considering the mobility of inventors, we consider Proposition 1 of the model concerning the rate at which firms spawned spinoffs. Klepper [2010] estimated a logit model of the annual rate at patents as one observation, the second B patent and the A 1 patent as a second observation, the A 1 patent and the second A patent as a third observation, and the third and fourth A patents as a fourth observation. 11 For example, Walter C. Seelbach had 24 patents over the period 1966 to 1994, including two in 1967, two in 1970, and three in 1978. Except for one of the 1970 patents, which was assigned to Fairchild, all the rest were assigned to Motorola. The patent assigned to Fairchild involved a co-inventor whose name was listed first, which may have played a role in the assignment of the patent. In cases like this, we assumed the inventor had always worked at Motorola and the patent assigned to Fairchild was due to the co-inventor.
which firms on the ICE lists spawned spinoffs that also made it onto the ICE lists. Among the ICE firms in our dataset, the most prolific spawners of spinoffs were all Silicon Valley firms, including Fairchild with nine, Intel with six, and National and Seeq with three each. After controlling for firm market shares and other factors, Klepper [2010] found that the firms in Silicon Valley had roughly a five times higher spinoff rate than firms elsewhere, consistent with Proposition 1. A broader indicator of the influence of spinoffs on mobility is conveyed by Table 2 , which reports the overall inventor mobility rate at each of the 11 firms in our sample with at least 100 observations. The four firms with the highest mobility rates are, in order, Intel, National, Mostek, and Fairchild. As we noted, Intel, National, and Fairchild were all located in Silicon Valley and had the highest number of spinoffs among all the firms in our sample. 16 Perhaps even more telling is the other firm in the top four, Mostek, which was located in Dallas, TX. Its mobility rate of 9.6% was much higher than the mobility rate of inventors outside Silicon Valley of 2.8%. It was tied for the most spinoffs, two, of firms outside
Silicon Valley, and 7 of its 15 moves were to its two spinoffs. All of these patterns are consistent with Proposition 4. Table 2 suggests another factor that may be contributing to the higher mobility of the Silicon
Valley inventors. As reflected in the Appendix, by far the three largest patenters in our sample are RCA,
Texas Instruments, and Motorola, which were all large semiconductor producers that entered the industry early. They were all located outside of Silicon Valley and had very low mobility rates. Brown, Hamilton,
and Medoff [1990] and Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh [1998] find that within industries the mobility rate of U.S. workers is lower at larger firms, which also pay higher wages. Our inventors are predominantly scientists and engineers, and Elfenbein, Hamilton and Zenger [2010] report that for U.S. scientists and engineers job turnover declines sharply with firm size. Conceivably the mobility rate outside of Silicon
Valley was lower because RCA, TI, and Motorola were larger and paid higher wages to their inventors.
Consistent with this conjecture, among the rest of the firms outside Silicon Valley the mobility rate of inventors was 6.2% versus 2.2% for the inventors at RCA, TI, and Motorola.
We can analyze where the inventors came from that were hired by each firm, which bears on Proposition 3. We consider three groups of firms: the three early major spinoffs from Fairchild, National, Intel, and AMD; the 34 other, later spinoffs in Silicon Valley with parents in our sample; and the seven spinoffs outside of Silicon Valley with parents in our sample. We distinguished National, Intel, and AMD from the later Silicon Valley spinoffs for two reasons. First, they entered when there were few firms to hire from in Silicon Valley other than their (common) parent, Fairchild. Although we assumed Silicon
Valley spinoffs could hire all their initial workers locally, this would have been difficult for National, Intel, and AMD. Consequently, it might be expected that the fraction of their hires from outside their 15 These differences are significant at the .01 and .05 levels respectively based on Fisher's exact test. 16 Seeq was tied with National with three spinoffs on our list, but it entered much later and only had 24 observations.
Its mobility rate, albeit on a small sample, was 20.8%, consistent with expectations based on Proposition 4. Among these observations, the subsequent mobility rate was 3.3% (4 moves in 120 observations) for inventors that had previously moved to a spinoff of their parent and 7.7% for all the other inventors (25 moves in 323 observations). 18 These patterns are consistent with Proposition 5.
V. Statistical Analysis
In this section we test statistically the key predictions of the model, namely that entry of spinoffs initially raises the mobility of inventors at their parents, at other firms in their region, and at firms located elsewhere. We also estimate the extent to which the higher mobility of inventors in Silicon Valley can be accounted for by the concentration of (spinoff) entrants there.
We begin with a simple accounting in Table 3 of the aggregate moves of inventors and the effect of these moves on the relative mobility of Silicon Valley inventors. Panel I of A priori, the sign of this coefficient could go either way depending on the fraction of prior movers that would not move again because they are more productive at their new employer.
The coefficient estimates reported under Model 2 all have the expected signs and a number are significant. The longer the inventor's tenure at firm A, the more patents the inventor recently assigned to firm A, the greater the number of co-inventors on the inventor's patents at firm A, and the greater the selfcitation rate to the inventor's patents at firm A, then the less likely the inventor is to leave firm A, with the effects of all but Tenure significant. Inventors whose firms are acquired are more likely to move, particularly less productive inventors, although neither effect is significant. Last, the coefficient estimate of Prior Move is positive, suggesting that inventors that moved once were more likely to move again than other inventors, although it is not significant. The addition of these variables causes the coefficient estimate of Silicon Valley to fall to 0.999, which implies that the probability of moving relative to not moving is 2.72 times greater for inventors in Silicon Valley. This decline reflects that on average the number of recent patents, the percentage of self citations, and firm tenure were lower for inventors in Silicon Valley than elsewhere.
Proposition 4 predicts that mobility of a firm's inventors will be directly related to the number of recent spinoffs it spawned. We again allow for up to five years for the firm to complete its initial hires.
Accordingly, in Model 3, for each observation (A 1 ,B 2 ) we add a variable, denoted as Number of Spinoffs, equal to the number of spinoffs of firm A in the five years before date 1. As expected, the coefficient estimate of Number of Spinoffs is positive and significant. It implies that for each additional spinoff a firm spawns, the probability of its inventors moving relative to not moving increases by 28.5% during the first five years of the spinoff. The coefficient of Silicon Valley falls to 0.727, reflecting that part of the higher mobility of inventors in Silicon Valley is due to a greater incidence of spinoffs hiring inventors from their parents in Silicon Valley than elsewhere. The reduction in the coefficient estimate implies that the probability of moving relative to not moving is now 2.07 times higher for inventors in Silicon Valley, 16 which is not far from the relative mobility rate of 2.6 in Panel II of Unfortunately, unlike the variable Number of Spinoffs, there is virtually no cross sectional variation in the variable Number of SVEntrants. Consequently its estimated effect largely works off the correlation over the years spanned in our sample of average inventor mobility in a region and the rate of entry in Silicon Valley. Not only is this not a lot to go on, but we also had to impose a dating on moves that is inexact and thus likely to introduce further complications.
Subject to these caveats, in Model 4 we begin by allowing Number of SVEntrants to affect the mobility only of inventors in Silicon Valley, which is achieved by entering Number of SVEntrants times the 1-0 dummy variable SV, which equals 1 if firm A in observation (A 1 ,B 2 ) is in Silicon Valley.
Consistent with proposition 4, the coefficient estimate of Number of SVEntrants*SV is positive, although it is not significant. It implies that each additional entrant in Silicon Valley increased the probability of moving relative to not moving of inventors at other Silicon Valley firms during the entrant's first five years by 2.2%. This is smaller than the effect of an additional spinoff on the mobility of inventors at the spinoff's parent, as would be expected. The coefficient estimate of Silicon Valley drops sharply and is now only significant at the 10% level, reflecting that a substantial part of the higher mobility of inventors in Silicon Valley is due to the greater incidence of spinoffs hiring inventors from local firms (other than their parents) in Silicon Valley than elsewhere.
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In Model 5 we multiply Number of SVEntrants by (1 -SV) to allow entry in Silicon Valley to affect the mobility of inventors elsewhere. The theoretical model rules out such an effect, although it was certainly present early on when the number of firms and inventors in Silicon Valley was small. The coefficient estimate of this variable is positive but not significant and is smaller than the coefficient 21 This variable includes all entrants, not just spinoffs, in Silicon Valley, although nearly all the entrants there were spinoffs. 22 We also experimented with expressing the number of entrants in Silicon Valley relative to the number of incumbents in Silicon Valley based on the logic of the theoretical model, which suggests that the effect of entry will be smaller the larger the number of inventors in Silicon Valley. The coefficient estimate of this version of the variable was positive but not significant, which may reflect that the number of incumbents is not a good measure of the number of inventors in Silicon Valley.
estimate of Number of SVEntrants, as would be expected based on the model. 23 The addition of this variable increases the coefficient estimate of Silicon Valley, although it is no longer significant. It implies that the probability of moving relative to not moving is 1.83 times higher for Silicon Valley inventors.
Proposition 5 predicts that among inventors that moved, those that moved from a parent to spinoff would be less likely to move again. To test this, in Model 6 we include a variable, denoted as Movers from Parent to Spinoff, which equals 1 for observations of inventors that previously moved from a parent to one of its spinoffs. The coefficient estimate of Movers from Parent to Spinoff is negative, consistent with Proposition 5, but it is not significant.
Last, in Model 7 we control for the log of the number of patents issued to firm A in the year before the observation (plus 1 to accommodate firms with no prior patents), which would be expected to influence negatively the mobility rate at firm A. We allow this variable, denoted as Log(Firm patents), to have a separate effect for Silicon Valley and non-Silicon Valley firms to test whether size affects mobility differently across regions. The coefficient estimates of both variables are negative, significant, and quite close in magnitude, supporting the idea that the mobility of inventors is lower at larger firms. When these variables are included, the coefficient estimate of Silicon Valley drops to 0.207, which implies a probability of moving relative to not moving of 1.23, and is no longer significant. This is consistent with our earlier finding that excluding RCA, TI, and Motorola, the mobility rates of inventors in Silicon Valley and elsewhere are virtually the same after accounting for moves from parents to their recent spinoffs and other recent entrants. Controlling for firm size also causes the coefficient of Number of SV Entrants for Silicon Valley inventors to become larger and significant, consistent with the model.
VI. Discussion
We developed a model of spinoffs and mobility of inventors in which spinoffs hire inventors from their parents, from other local firms, and if needed from non-local firms. The model predicts higher mobility of inventors in Silicon Valley than elsewhere, with the higher mobility confined to inventors at firms experiencing recent spinoffs and located near other firms with recent spinoffs. The model also 23 Comparing the coefficients in this manner is tricky because model 5 is equivalent to specifying an interaction between the dummy variable Silicon Valley and the variable Number of SVEntrants (with the latter allowed to affect inventors at all firms), and interaction effects in non-linear models depend on the values of the explanatory variables in complex ways (Ai and Norton [2003] Mobility rates of inventors were highest at firms around the times they spawned their spinoffs and when spawning rates of other local firms were high. Inventor moves from parents to spinoffs and from incumbent firms to entrants accounted for over half of the greater mobility of inventors in Silicon Valley.
The remaining higher mobility of inventors in Silicon Valley was similar across time periods,
suggesting it was not due to the clustering of the industry in Silicon Valley, which increased over time.
One possibility is that it has nothing to do with regional differences in inventor mobility rates but is related to the presence outside of Silicon Valley of by far the three largest patenters in the semiconductor industry, Motorola, Texas Instruments, and RCA. If these firms are excluded, the mobility rate of inventors in Silicon Valley and elsewhere is virtually the same. Econometrically, once the influence on inventor mobility of firm size as well as recent spinoffs and other recent entrants is taken into account, there is also no significant difference between the mobility of inventors in Silicon Valley and elsewhere.
These patterns are not only consistent with the model but are not predicted by alternative theories of why mobility rates would be higher in clusters.
Our methodology for analyzing the mobility of semiconductor inventors has a number of limitations that should be considered. First, it restricts moves to those between merchant ICE firms and does not capture moves to captive semiconductor producers, lesser semiconductor firms, or nonsemiconductor producers. However, apart from AT&T and IBM, which were large captive producers, our firms represent all the major semiconductor innovators in the era we study and thus the firms accounting for most of the flows of inventors. 24 Second, we cannot capture flows in which inventors do not patent at both the source and destination firms. This is common to all studies of employee mobility that use patent data. It is not clear how, if at all, this might affect our conclusions. Last, the timing of mobility is based on a rule that cannot precisely date every move. While we recognize that these rules are somewhat arbitrary, some kind of designation for time periods is necessary for us to identify a firm's formative period and the timing of inventor moves.
Our main conclusion is that the higher mobility of semiconductor inventors in Silicon Valley was directly caused by the higher rate of spinoffs in Silicon Valley rather than the clustering of the industry there or California's ban on the enforcement of employee non-compete covenants. This does not rule, however, that either factor might have indirectly led to higher mobility of semiconductor inventors in Silicon Valley by affecting the rate at which spinoffs were formed in Silicon Valley versus elsewhere. Indeed, our model features such an indirect effect of clustering on mobility via the formation of spinoffs.
However, it is important to recognize that anything that results in clusters having higher spinoff rates will promote job mobility in the model. If the semiconductor industry clustered in Silicon Valley merely because of the high rate of spinoffs of Fairchild and other Silicon Valley firms (Klepper [2009 (Klepper [ , 2010 ), then job mobility would also be higher there based on the logic of the model. Alternatively, if the high rate of spinoffs from Fairchild spurred later spinoffs in the region due to peer effects (Nanda and Sørensen Our interpretation of the greater mobility of inventors in Silicon Valley implies that the benefits of such hiring were reaped primarily by entrants. This is consistent with Sorenson and Stuart's [2000] finding that younger firms are more likely than older rivals to exploit external knowledge. It could also help explain the finding of Almeida, Dokko, and Rosenkopf [2003] that inventor mobility in the semiconductor industry disproportionately benefits hiring firms that are small, which will tend to be recent entrants. Agarwal et al. [2009] find that in the semiconductor industry tougher IP enforcement by a firm reduces spillovers of knowledge associated with the loss of its workers to rivals, especially to younger and smaller firms. This is consistent with our findings that incumbent semiconductor firms served as unwitting training grounds for the initial employees of spinoffs.
The absence of a direct effect of clustering on job mobility has important implications for public policy and business strategy. The standard argument is that clustering promotes job mobility and the diffusion of knowledge among all firms in clusters, enabling them to be closer to the technological frontier in their industry. This is a classic agglomeration economy externality that can justify public policies to promote clusters and also motivate incumbents to relocate in clusters. Alternatively, our results suggest 20 that incumbents in clusters do not realize any benefits related to the higher rate of labor mobility there. (Moore and Davis [2004] ). It all began with Fairchild, which was distinctive both in terms of how successful it was initially and how much it was racked by internal problems that fueled spinoffs.
Our model indicates how once started, the spinoff rate could have remained higher in Silicon Valley. 
